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Prior research suggests that young children associate fear with imaginary creatures more 
strongly than with realistic threats to safety. We propose an alternative: the Dual-Source Account 
of children's understanding of fear. In this account, as early as the age of 3 years, children associate 
both realistic and imaginary causes of fear with being scared, and this understanding increases 
with age. In the current study, children (N=48, 3-5 years) labeled the emotion of a story's 
protagonist who encountered either a realistic or imaginary fear-eliciting creature. Young 
preschoolers attributed fear to both imaginary and realistic creatures approximately half of the 
time, and their attribution of fear to both imaginary and realistic creatures increased steadily with 
age. Thus, as predicted by our account and evolutionary theorizing, the basis of children's 
understanding of fear includes both realistic and imaginary causes of fear.  
 






What do young children think is scary? Real threats to safety with which they 
have had a real experience (such as spiders or mean dogs) or imaginary causes with 
which they could never have had a real experience (such as monsters and ghosts)? 
Prior research supports the latter, showing that imaginary creatures loom large in 
young children's fear concept. Indeed, children think imaginary creatures are scarier 
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than real ones, even when they readily admit that these creatures are "just pretend" 
(Sayfan & Lagatutta, 2008, 2009). When asked to generate a story about a possible 
cause of fear, young children (4-8 years) are more likely to tell stories with 
imaginary causes than realistic ones (Denham & Zoller, 1991; Strayer, 1986). 
Children's references to such imaginary causes decrease with age (e.g., Lentz, 
1985; Muris, Merckelbach, Gadet, & Moulaert, 2000). In the current study, we 
show that imaginary causes of fear are not primary in young preschoolers' 
understanding of that emotion. Instead, young preschoolers understand both 
imaginary and realistic causes of fear equally. 
Two theoretical accounts on the relation between children's real-world 
knowledge and their ability to engage in pretense each explain why children are 
afraid of imaginary creatures. In the undifferentiated-imaginary account, 
preschoolers' fear of imaginary creatures reflects their undifferentiated and distorted 
perception of reality (Bauer, 1976). This account draws on Piaget's (1952, 1962) 
claim that the pre-operational child (2-7 years) is dominated by magical thinking 
and fails to understand that what they have merely imagined cannot become real. 
Recent research, however, has refuted the Piagetian claim that children younger 
than seven years cannot distinguish the real from the imagined (e.g., Flavell, 
Flavell, & Green, 1987; Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall, & Harmer, 1991; 
Samuels & Taylor, 1994; Wellman & Estes, 1986; Woolley & Phelps, 1994).  
 On the second account, the differentiated-imaginary account, preschoolers' 
fear of imaginary creatures reflects the emergence of pretend play in the second 
year of life and its quick development thereafter (Bleuler, 1951; Harris, 2000; 
Leslie, 1994). On this account, children's fear begins with realistic, experience-
based causes and only later broadens to include imaginary ones as children's 
imaginative abilities increase during the preschool years. Specifically, before 
children can pretend, they must have acquired a causal understanding of the real 
world. For example, a young child can learn to fear hot stoves via associative 
learning after burning herself on one (e.g., Watson & Rayner, 1920), by watching 
another person get burned (e.g., Askew & Field, 2007), or by hearing information 
about the hazards of touching a hot stove (e.g., Muris, Bodden, Merckelbach, 
Ollendick, & King, 2003). Imagining that one should not approach the stove 
because a fire-breathing dragon lives behind it requires an advanced imagination 
not entailed by the other examples. The differentiated-imaginary account, which 
focuses on children's experience of fear (i.e., what scares young children and why), 
raises questions about children's understanding of fear (what children think is 
scary), and how that understanding changes with age. 
We propose a cognitive-developmental account that we call the Dual-Source 
account that focuses on children's understanding of the causes of fear. In this 
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account, by three years of age, children's understanding of fear includes both 
realistic and imaginary causes, both of which increase with age. The Dual-Source 
account is consonant with evolutionary theorizing that preschoolers' fear of 
imaginary creatures is a byproduct of children's ability to anticipate real dangers 
(Barrett, 2005; Boyer & Bergstrom, 2011). On our account, neither realistic nor 
imaginary causes are the basis of children's understanding of fear because both 
reality and imagination are part of the process of producing fear. For example, there 
are real events – such as a snake in the grass or a charging bear in the woods – that 
produce startle and orienting reflexes that occur with minimal or no cognitive 
processing and that are labeled as fear. But aside from these reflexes, most cases 
labeled as fear include a cognitive appraisal of the future implications of a current 
situation. Fear typically involves anticipating the future (be it immediate, such as 
being mugged, or long-term, such as contemplating a major life change), thus both 
reality and imagination are involved. Conversely, most other emotions are caused 
primarily by past or current events. Typically, one is sad about a loss that already 
happened or angry with someone currently blocking a goal. Of course, any emotion 
can stem from the imagination, but the prototype of most emotions has real past or 
current causes, whereas the prototype of fear is about the future. These prototypes 
become central to the concept of each of these emotions. In this way, we assume 
that young children implicitly understand the role of imagination in producing fear 
but also understand that fear is not limited to the imagination. 
That children's understanding begins with both realistic and imaginary causes 
– neither of which is primary – raises the question of whether one type becomes 
more primary than the other as age increases. Our Dual-Source account is based on 
a script theory of emotion concept acquisition (Fehr & Russell, 1984; Russell, 
1991; Widen & Russell, 2008, 2010a). An emotion script is an ordered sequence of 
events that specifies, for example, the possible causes and behavioral consequences 
for that emotion – for fear, a negative event together with its imagined future 
implications (Widen & Russell, 2008, 2010a). A central assumption is that 
experience and age guide the acquisition of a script for each emotion. The fear 
script develops as children witness or experience real threats to safety, experience 
ambiguous situations (e.g., dark rooms, noises in the closet) that they interpret as 
scary, and hear culture-specific stories about the scary imaginary entities. Because 
the types and salience of fear-eliciting experiences vary with age, how children 
understand them may also vary with age. One focus of the current study is to 
explore how understanding of imaginary and realistic causes of fear changes with 
age.  
Contrary to both the Dual-Source and the differentiated-imaginary accounts, 
prior research on children's understanding of fear suggests that imaginary creatures 
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are primary in preschoolers' fear concept. When children are asked to tell stories 
about the possible causes of a protagonist's fear, children describe events involving 
imaginary creatures (e.g., monsters) more often than real dangers (e.g. thunder 
storms; Denham & Zoller, 1991; Strayer, 1986). Preschoolers' tendency to generate 
imaginary causes suggests that imaginary causes come to mind more readily than 
realistic ones, but this finding need not imply that imaginary causes are better 
understood as scary than are realistic ones. A more sensitive measure of children's 
understanding of fear requires a recognition task in which children label both 
imaginary and realistic causes.  
To our knowledge, only two studies have used a recognition task to examine 
children's understanding of fear (Sayfan & Lagattuta, 2008, 2009). Children (3-7 
years) heard brief stories about a protagonist who encounters either imaginary or 
realistic fear-eliciting creatures. Children were then asked whether the protagonist 
was "afraid or not afraid right now" and, if she was afraid, the degree to which she 
was afraid (2008, p. 824; 2009, p. 1760). Three- and 5-year-olds rated both 
imaginary and realistic causes as equally scary (Sayfan & Lagattuta, 2008) – a 
finding consistent with the Dual-Source view. Seven-year-olds, however, rated fear 
stories with imaginary causes as scarier than those with realistic ones, suggesting 
that imaginary causes become primary as age increases.  
The current study used a free-labeling response format. The free-labeling 
method investigates children's spontaneous interpretation of these different types of 
fear stories. This format has two advantages over the two-alternative forced-choice 
response format used in the Sayfan and Lagatutta studies. First, a free-labeling 
response format avoids the issue that people have a "yes" response bias (e.g., King, 
Hunter, & Schmidt, 1980) which may be exaggerated in preschoolers (e.g., Okanda 
& ItaKura, 2010). Second, a free-labeling response format provides additional 
information – specifically, what emotion, if not fear, a child attributes to a fear-
eliciting cause. In addition, this format is less productively demanding than the 
commonly used storytelling method (e.g., Denham & Zoller, 1991; Strayer, 1986). 
Thus, we expected that the free-labeling task would provide a more sensitive 
measure of young children's understanding of fear than methods used in prior 
research.  
The primary purpose of our studies was to examine whether young 
preschoolers are more likely to associate fear with imaginary causes, realistic 
causes, or both, and how that understanding changes with age. If children's 
experience of fear parallels their understanding of fear, then the differentiated-
imaginary account implies that younger preschoolers will be more likely to label 
the realistic-fear stories as scared than imaginary-fear ones. Young children's 
labeling of the realistic-fear stories as scared will be high and remain relatively 
Kayyal, M.H., Widen, S.C.: Dual-Source Theory of Fear 
 
371 
stable with age whereas their labeling of the imaginary-fear stories as scared is 
expected to be low and to increase with age, particularly during the older preschool 
years when children's imaginative abilities increase (Harris, 2000). Our Dual-
Source account implies that younger preschoolers will label both realistic and 
imaginary causes as scared with equal probability and explores possible age-related 
changes. 
To our knowledge, the current studies are the first to use free-labeling to trace 
the development of children's (3-7 years) understanding of realistic and imaginary 
causes of fear. Children labeled four fear stories interspersed with stories for other 
emotions, which were included to hide the purpose of the study, and to show that 
children can label the emotion of a story's protagonist. After each story, children 





In a preliminary study, children (N=108, 3-7 years) labeled the emotion of a 
story protagonist in four fear (two realistic, two imaginary) stories, shown in the 
appendix, and three other causes (one each of happiness, sadness, and anger). Each 
story also included behavioral consequences of the emotion (e.g., for fear, screams 
and runs away).  
The results were consistent with the predictions of the Dual-Source account. 
Children associated fear with both imaginary and realistic causes. Of the 108 
children, only 8% labeled only one type of fear cause (imaginary or realistic) but 
not the other. The remaining 92% either labeled neither or both types of fear stories 
as scared.  
The percentage of 3-4 year olds who labeled both the imaginary (57%) and 
realistic (50%) fear stories as scared was moderate and did not significantly differ; 
children's performance on both types increased with age, but did so more 
dramatically for imaginary causes than realistic ones: 5-year-olds were more likely 
to label the imaginary stories (90%) as scared than the realistic ones (69%), but this 
gap was closing for the 6-7-year-olds (96% and 85%, respectively). When children 
did not label the fear stories as scared, they were most likely to label them as sad; 
this was true for all ages. 
The results of the preliminary study supported the Dual-Source account by 
indicating that the youngest children (3-4 years) understood both realistic and 
imaginary causes of fear. But there were two concerns with the method of this 
study. First was that the ontological status of the fear-eliciting creatures was not 
made explicit to the child (and, in one case, may have been ambiguous: "…Sally 
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saw a howling ghost. She tried to touch it but her hand went right through it: It was 
a real ghost."). Thus, it is possible that children labeled the fear stories as scared 
because children misinterpreted the intended status of the creature. In the main 
study, the ontological status of the creature as real or imaginary was explicitly 
stated in each fear story.  
A second concern was that children labeled the fear stories as scared based on 
the behavioral consequence (e.g., "She screamed and ran away"). That is, children 
may have been labeling the behavioral consequence rather than the situational 
cause. However, in two other studies children (3-7 years) labeled imaginary and 
realistic causes of fear as scared, even when a behavioral consequence was not 
provided (Kayyal, Widen, & Russell, 2013; Widen & Russell, 2010b). When 
children's understanding of the causes vs. the consequences of emotions were 
compared, children were more likely to label a fear cause than a fear consequence 
as scared (Widen & Russell, 2011). To rule out the possibility that children's 
success on the fear stories in the preliminary study was due to behavioral 
consequences in each story, the stories in the current study included only the 





The current study modified the preliminary study in three specific ways: (1) 
The ontological status of the fear-eliciting creatures was made explicit: Children 
were told that the creature was either "real" or "just pretend." (2) The imaginary and 
realistic causes of fear were made parallel (e.g., real sharks and imaginary sea-
monsters both have sharp teeth) to ensure that variations in children's responses 
were specifically related to the real or imaginary status of the fear-eliciting stimuli, 
and not to other factors. (3) Only the situational cause (and not the behavioral 
consequence) was presented in each story. We predicted that the age-related 
changes found in the preliminary study would persist given these changes: The 
younger preschoolers would label both imaginary and realistic causes as scared 
equally, but less often than older preschoolers, and that older preschoolers would 
label imaginary causes as scared more often than realistic causes. 
 
 







Participants were children (N=48, 3-5 years) recruited from the children's 
museums in Boston. All children were proficient in English. There were 24 young 
preschoolers (38 to 53 months, mean=46.0 months) and 24 older preschoolers (54 




Stories of emotional events. There were four fear stories (two imaginary and 
two realistic) describing stereotypical emotion-eliciting events, shown in the 
appendix. Each story explicitly stated whether the creature was imaginary or real. 





Each child was tested individually in an area of the museum designated for 
testing.  
Priming. In order to prime the child's emotion vocabulary, the experimenter 
and child had a conversation in which the words happy, sad, mad, scared, 
surprised, and disgusted occurred. This priming procedure gave the child an 
opportunity to become more comfortable with the experimenter, and made it more 
likely that the relevant emotion labels were accessible. The experimenter began: 
"First we are going to talk about feelings. Feelings are like when you feel happy or 
sad. Do you ever feel happy?"… "Sad is another feeling. Have you ever felt sad?", 
etc. The experimenter did not discuss when or why these emotions might occur. 
After each question, the child was given the opportunity to respond. If the child 
spontaneously offered an example of when someone had felt a particular emotion, 
the experimenter listened but did not comment on the child's story or encourage 
further explanation. Every effort was made throughout the experiment to use a 
neutral tone of voice when presenting the emotion words. 
Animal labeling task. Next was an animal labeling task, which served as a 
practice trial and a comparison task for the free-labeling of the emotion stories. The 
child heard brief descriptions of three common animals (cat, dog, rabbit; e.g., "This 
kind of animal can purr and likes to catch mice") and were asked to label it before 
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the experimenter showed them the corresponding picture. The animals were 
presented in random orders.  
Story labeling task. Finally, the experimenter introduced the story labeling 
task as a new game in which the child would hear brief stories about a girl named 
Sally. There were nine emotion trials, two for fear with realistic causes and two for 
fear with imaginary causes, and one each for happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, 
disgust. The happy trial was always first, and served as a gate-keeping trial: The 
child had to label this trial as happy (or some close synonym) to be included in the 
sample. The other stories were presented in a random order with the proviso that no 
more than two fear stories were presented consecutively. The first story began, 
"Once upon a time," and the other stories began, "One week later…" After each 
story, the experimenter asked, "How do you think Sally feels?" 
At no time during the labeling trials did the experimenter use the word 
emotion, provide any emotion labels, or otherwise direct the child to try to use an 




Animal labeling task. The labels scored as correct in the cat category were cat, 
kitty; in the dog category, dog; in the rabbit category, rabbit, bunny. Children used 
no other labels. 
Story labeling task. The participants were allowed to use any label they chose. 
The scoring key used in this study was drawn from Widen and Russell (2003), who 
described the development of a scoring key based on ratings of two judges blind to 
the source of the labels. Any labels that were used by children in the current study 
that had not been previously rated underwent the same rating procedure. The labels 
that occurred in this study and that were scored as correct were: for happiness, 
happy, good, excited; for fear, scared, frightened, afraid; for anger, angry, mad, 
grumpy; for sad, sad, upset; for surprise: surprised, shocked, startled; for disgust: 
disgusted, yucky, icky, gross, nasty. Responses could vary from what was just listed 
in syntax or by being embedded in a phrase (e.g., very scared). These were all the 
labels children used in the current study that came close to specifying the one of the 
target emotions.  
 
 





The 48 children had 144 opportunities to label an animal. They did so 
correctly on 100% of trials.  
Children had 432 opportunities to label an emotion story. They did so 
"correctly" on 52% (226) of trials; 47% (201) were emotion labels scored as 
"incorrect"; 1% (5) non-responses or silly responses (e.g., crazy). The percentage of 
correct emotion labels was significantly lower than the percentage of correct animal 
labels, dependent samples t47=12.69, p<.001. The rank order of "correct" responses 
to the stories was: sad, 92%; happy, 90%; scared, 56%; angry, 27%; disgusted, 
27%; and surprised, 13%.  
 
Imaginary or Realistic Fear First? 
 
Children associated fear with both imaginary and realistic causes. Figure 1 
shows that children in each age group either labeled neither or both types of fear 
stories as scared. Only 6% of children labeled only the fear stories with an 
imaginary cause but not those with a realistic one as scared, and only 6% labeled 
only the fear stories with a realistic cause but not those with an imaginary one as 
scared. A Chi Square test (N=48), comparing children who labeled neither or both 
types of fear stories as scared (42) to those who labeled only fear stories with 
imaginary or only realistic causes (6), confirmed that children were unlikely to 
associate fear with only one type of cause, χ2(df=1)=27.00, p<.001. Separate Chi 
Square tests indicated that this difference was significant at each age: younger 
preschoolers, χ2(df=1)=33.33, p<.001; older preschoolers, χ2(df=1)=21.33, p<.001. 
 
Figure 1. The Percentage of Children Who Labeled the Fear Stories With  
Imaginary and Realistic Causes as Scared 
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"Correct" Use of Scared 
 
To examine the proportion of children who "correctly" labeled the fear stories 
as scared, responses to the two fear stories with imaginary causes were added 
together and divided by two. The same was done for the two with realistic causes. 
In a mixed-design ANOVA (alpha=.05), age (2 levels: younger preschoolers, older 
preschoolers) and sex (2 levels) were between-subjects factors, and type of cause (2 
levels: imaginary, realistic) was the within-subject factor.1
The effects for age and type of fear are presented in Table 1. Although older 
preschoolers labeled the fear stories as scared more frequently than the younger 
preschoolers, the main effect for age was not significant, F(1,46)=.11, p=.75. 
Children's performance on both types of fear stories increased with age and the Age 
x Type-of-Fear interaction was not significant, F(1,46)=.11, p=.75. There were no 
significant effects involving sex.  
  
 
Table 1. Mean Proportion of Children Who "Correctly" Labeled  
the Fear Stories as "Scared" 
 
 Type of Fear  
Age Group Imaginary Realistic Mean 
Younger Preschoolers .44 .46 .45 
Older Preschoolers .67 .67 .67 
Mean .55 .56  
Note. Maximum possible is 1.00. For each type of fear, there were two stories.  
 
"Incorrect" Responses to the Fear Stories 
 
When children did not label the fear stories as scared, they were most likely to 
label them as sad. Indeed, 57% of children's "incorrect" responses to the fear stories 
were sad (17% angry, 16% happy, 5% surprised, and 5% non-responses). For each 
age group, the most frequent "incorrect" response to the fear stories was sad; 
children's use of sad remained stable with age (25% for the younger children, 21% 
for the older children) as their use of scared increased with age (from 35% to 66%, 
respectively). 
  
                                                 
1 When this analysis was repeated with each of the four fear stories (dragon story, sea monster story, 
alligator story, and shark story) included as a within-subject factor, the results were the same: There 
were no significant main effects and no interactions. 
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Summary. As in the preliminary study, the young preschoolers labeled both 
types of fear as scared at the same moderate level. The older preschoolers were 
more likely than the younger preschoolers to label both types of fear stories as 
scared. Unlike the preliminary study, there was no advantage of one type of fear 





The results of the current study support our Dual-Source account of children's 
understanding of fear. The youngest children associated fear with both realistic and 
imaginary causes with equal probability, and children's understanding of both 
increased steadily with age. Contrary to prior research (Denham & Zoller, 1991; 
Sayfan & Lagatutta, 2008, 2009; Strayer, 1986), there was no advantage of 
imaginary causes over realistic ones for any age group – at least when the 
ontological status of the fear-eliciting stimulus was explicitly stated. Thus, by the 
age of three years, children have already developed a script for fear that includes 
both realistic and imaginary causes. Children are learning about the causes of fear 
through first-hand (e.g., encountering a real angry dog) and second-hand 
experiences (e.g., hearing cultural narratives about imaginary creatures) from an 
early age, and both types of learning appear equally effective.  
Our central assumption is that young children's fear concept includes both 
imaginary and realistic causes, neither of which precedes or has an advantage over 
the other because reality and imagination (anticipating the future) are both part of 
the same process of producing fear. Our assumption is consonant with evolutionary 
theorizing – that preschoolers' fear of monsters, ghosts, and other imaginary 
creatures is part of children's ability to anticipate real predators (Barrett, 2005; 
Boyer & Bergstrom, 2011). Preschool is when children increasingly explore their 
environment in the absence of a primary caregiver, a time during which 
anticipating and avoiding real threats becomes increasingly important. Thus, 
children's understanding of realistic fears must increase at the same pace as their 
understanding of imaginary ones; the primacy of one type of fear over the other 
offers no advantage. Indeed, our results supported this prediction.  
The question remains as to why approximately half of the young preschoolers' 
responses (55%) for the fear causes were not scared. It is possible that (a) they did 
not know how to label something – but this explanation is incorrect since they 
labeled animals and other emotion stories. Or (b) they did not know a label for fear, 
even though scared was primed prior to the free-labeling task. This explanation is 
unlikely, given evidence from observational studies showing that 80% of two-year-
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olds use scared appropriately in spontaneous conversation (e.g., Ridgeway, Waters, 
& Kuczaj, 1985; Wellman, Harris, Banerjee, & Sinclair, 1995). It is possible that 
there is a developmental lag in young children's understanding of fear: Perhaps 
young children can recognize what is frightening in their environment before they 
can recognize a description of a frightening event.  
The youngest children in our studies were 3-year-olds. Three years is the 
appropriate age for the youngest children in a free-labeling study on fear: This is 
the age at which children begin to use scared to label stories (Widen & Russell, 
2010b, 2011) and faces (e.g., Widen & Russell, 2003, 2008). Half of the three-year-
olds in the current study never used scared for any of the fear stories. Thus, 
studying two-year-olds might yield more information on children's early 
understanding of fear, but we anticipate that two-year-olds would not label either 
type of fear story as scared. Two-year-olds are unlikely to use scared on a labeling 
task (Widen & Russell, 2003, 2008) (indeed, young two-year-olds are unlikely to 
provide any labels; Widen & Russell, 2010b). It remains possible that children who 
are younger may understand one of the types of causes – imaginary or realistic – 
better than the other, but this possibility is difficult to test.  
Some caution is recommended in interpreting our findings as only a small 
sample of stories were used (2 realistic and 2 imaginary fear stories). Not all 
children have heard of dragons and sea monsters and fewer have encountered 
sharks or alligators. Thus, it is possible that children's recognition of the realistic 
causes of fear may have been underestimated. Future research might include a 
wider variety of fear stories for each type of cause. 
At every age, when children did not label the fear stories as scared, they were 
most likely to label them as sad. Children's earlier-emerging emotion categories are 
broad and do not correspond to adult-like discrete emotion categories even though 
children use the same label (Widen, 2013; Widen & Russell, 2003, 2008). Thus, 
although some children labeled the fear stories as sad, their understanding of this 
label may have been more similar to feels bad than to the adult understanding of 
sadness. As age increased, children were more likely to label both realistic and 
imaginary causes of fear as scared, suggesting that their emotion concepts were 
becoming more adult-like. 
Of course, that some children do not correctly label a protagonist in a 
frightening scenario – whether real or imaginary – as scared is discrepant with 
children's fearful behaviors in frightening situations. Consider, for example, a 
young child who hesitates to go into a dark bedroom alone. The young child's 
hesitant behavior is consistent with experiencing fear specifically and not simply 
any negative emotion, such as sadness or anger. Thus, our findings highlight a lag 
between the experience of fear and an understanding of a frightening event as 
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scary. The phenomenon in which the emotion precedes cognition has been 
demonstrated in various Theory of Mind domains (Bradmetz & Schneider, 1999, 
2004; Ruffman & Keenan, 1996). From an evolutionary perspective, and especially 
for fear, it is perhaps more adaptive for the emotion (and the emotional reaction) to 
precede a cognitive evaluation of the event. In addition, recall that evolutionary 
theorizing suggests that preschoolers' fear of imaginary creatures is a byproduct of 
children's ability to anticipate real dangers (Barrett, 2005; Boyer & Bergstrom, 
2011). Perhaps young children can anticipate dangers and feel afraid without 
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Realistic and Imaginary Fear-Eliciting Stories Used  
in the Preliminary and Current Study 
 
Realistic  Imaginary 
Preliminary Study  
"One week later, Sally was walking 
down the street and she saw a big, mean 
dog. As Sally got closer to the dog, the 
dog started growling, barking, and 
chasing Sally." 
 
"One night, Sally was sleeping in her bed. 
Then something woke her up. Sally's room 
was dark, and she was all alone. 
Something was moving in Sally's closet. 
She thought it was a monster." 
"One day Sally was playing in her 
sandbox. Suddenly, she felt something 
crawling on her leg. It was a big black 
spider." 
 
"On Halloween, Sally went trick-or-
treating. Sally went to the door and rang 
the doorbell. The door opened and Sally 
saw a howling ghost. Sally tried to touch 
it, but her hand went right though it: It was 
a real ghost." 
Current Study  
"Do you know what alligators are? 
Alligators are really big reptiles that live 
in swamps and have lots of sharp teeth. 
And alligators are real. One week later, 
Sally was walking by a swamp. Ahead, 
she saw a big alligator. The alligator 
showed its sharp teeth and started 
running toward Sally."  
 
"Do you know what dragons are? Dragons 
are big reptiles that can fly and breathe 
fire. But, dragons are just pretend. One 
week later, Sally was walking by a swamp. 
She imagined that she saw a dragon. The 
dragon would show its big teeth and start 
running toward Sally."  
"Do you know what sharks are? Sharks 
are large fish that live in the ocean and 
have lots of really sharp teeth. And 
sharks are real. One week later, Sally 
was swimming at the beach. Ahead, she 
saw a big shark. The shark saw her and 
started swimming quickly towards 
Sally." 
 
"Do you know what sea monsters are? Sea 
monsters are large monsters that live in the 
ocean and have lots of really sharp teeth. 
But, sea monsters are just pretend. One 
week later, Sally was swimming at the 
beach. She imagined that she saw a big sea 
monster. The sea monster would see her 
and start quickly swimming towards her." 
 
